A time for steady nerves and ruthless clear-sightedness
On an earlier occasion when a Conservative government faced an opposition which was in complete disarray and the suggestion was being made in some quarters that with no effective alternative the Tories might be in power for a long time, I remember the response of the then Father of the House, Sir Bernard Braine MP.
"That's dangerous talk!" he barked, like an angry colonel warning his men not to get cocky and to keep their heads down where there might be enemy snipers about.
And by God, he was so right.
Just five years after the shock Conservative victory in 1992 left Labour morale in tatters came Blair's 1997 New Labour landslide.
Of course there is a massive element of schadenfreude for Conservatives in reading accounts of first UKIP and then Labour tearing themselves to pieces, and the temptation to gloat is almost irresistible, especially as in both cases, as the ironic saying goes, it couldn't happen to a nicer bunch of people.
But don't lets kid ourselves that the electorate loves us or that the Conservative position is secure.
David Cameron won because the alternatives seemed absolutely dire and because millions of voters just could not bring themselves to risk voting Labour. One of the reasons the polls were wrong is probably that many people who actively disliked the Conservative offer found in the actual voting booth with a pencil in their hand that the alternatives terrified them even more.
There are lessons for Conservatives too in the rubble of the Miliband campaign.
There are one or two very interesting comments in a Guardian article about the failure of Labour's campaign (and how some senior figures in the party have still not wised up) which you can read at
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/16/labour-great-crisis-ever.
Many Conservatives and journalists had strongly suspected that Ed Miliband was running a 35% strategy - trying to win with that percentage of the vote based on former Lib/Dem voters moving to Labour and former Tory voters going UKIP.
In the article linked to above, Labour MP John Cruddas confirms this and also says where it came from: the 35% strategy had it's roots in the "Omnishambles" e.g. the mistakes the Conservatives made in 2012.
He argues that because the "Omnishambles" gave Labour a temporary double digit poll lead "which we hadn't earned" it created a temptation to play it safe, and instead of doing the "heavy lifting" of thinking out a big, positive strategy and addressing the party's problems, they tried to stick with the messages which motivated the Labour base and with easy hits - policies with which they thought people would feel comfortable but which did not really show any signs of addressing the difficult questions or moving outside Labour's comfort zone.
That argument works the other way around. Labour and UKIP are in a terrible mess and the Lib/Dems have had the worst beating I can ever recall a party getting. But the Conservatives cannot afford to assume that none of those parties will get their act together and reconnect with voters.
We need to use the next few months to do the difficult things which need doing but are not popular. And the Conservatives need to make every effort to reconnect with voters ourselves.
Someone famously said at the time that John Major's government in 1992, with a majority of 21, was at the mercy of eleven madmen: David Cameron's government, with a majority of 12, could find itself at the mercy of just seven backbench rebels.
So we have to make a start as soon as possible on compassionate but effective welfare reform, keeping the promises made to Scotland during the referendum (which means what it says, not appeasing every demand from the SNP), getting the boundary changes through, and measures to continue the economic recovery.
The bill to set up a referendum on EU membership also needs to be addressed quickly, and every effort made to ensure insofar as this is possible that both "In" and "Out" sides regard the question asked, as well as the rules for the referendum such as the arrangements for TV coverage of each side of the debate, spending limits etc as fair.
This is important for the country but doubly so for the Conservatives: it is inevitable that significant parts of the Conservative party will be on each side of the referendum debate. Whichever way it goes the successful side is going to have to work with the people who have lost. That will be much easier if the people on the losing side accept that the result was fair and genuinely reflected the will of the British people, than if they feel robbed.
To keep moving forward on the difficult measures necessary to maintain the recovery and resist the temptation to start fighting amongst ourselves when Labour fails for a while to provide an effective opposition will require steady nerves and ruthless clear-sightedness. But it must be done.
"That's dangerous talk!" he barked, like an angry colonel warning his men not to get cocky and to keep their heads down where there might be enemy snipers about.
And by God, he was so right.
Just five years after the shock Conservative victory in 1992 left Labour morale in tatters came Blair's 1997 New Labour landslide.
Of course there is a massive element of schadenfreude for Conservatives in reading accounts of first UKIP and then Labour tearing themselves to pieces, and the temptation to gloat is almost irresistible, especially as in both cases, as the ironic saying goes, it couldn't happen to a nicer bunch of people.
But don't lets kid ourselves that the electorate loves us or that the Conservative position is secure.
David Cameron won because the alternatives seemed absolutely dire and because millions of voters just could not bring themselves to risk voting Labour. One of the reasons the polls were wrong is probably that many people who actively disliked the Conservative offer found in the actual voting booth with a pencil in their hand that the alternatives terrified them even more.
There are lessons for Conservatives too in the rubble of the Miliband campaign.
There are one or two very interesting comments in a Guardian article about the failure of Labour's campaign (and how some senior figures in the party have still not wised up) which you can read at
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/16/labour-great-crisis-ever.
Many Conservatives and journalists had strongly suspected that Ed Miliband was running a 35% strategy - trying to win with that percentage of the vote based on former Lib/Dem voters moving to Labour and former Tory voters going UKIP.
In the article linked to above, Labour MP John Cruddas confirms this and also says where it came from: the 35% strategy had it's roots in the "Omnishambles" e.g. the mistakes the Conservatives made in 2012.
He argues that because the "Omnishambles" gave Labour a temporary double digit poll lead "which we hadn't earned" it created a temptation to play it safe, and instead of doing the "heavy lifting" of thinking out a big, positive strategy and addressing the party's problems, they tried to stick with the messages which motivated the Labour base and with easy hits - policies with which they thought people would feel comfortable but which did not really show any signs of addressing the difficult questions or moving outside Labour's comfort zone.
That argument works the other way around. Labour and UKIP are in a terrible mess and the Lib/Dems have had the worst beating I can ever recall a party getting. But the Conservatives cannot afford to assume that none of those parties will get their act together and reconnect with voters.
We need to use the next few months to do the difficult things which need doing but are not popular. And the Conservatives need to make every effort to reconnect with voters ourselves.
Someone famously said at the time that John Major's government in 1992, with a majority of 21, was at the mercy of eleven madmen: David Cameron's government, with a majority of 12, could find itself at the mercy of just seven backbench rebels.
So we have to make a start as soon as possible on compassionate but effective welfare reform, keeping the promises made to Scotland during the referendum (which means what it says, not appeasing every demand from the SNP), getting the boundary changes through, and measures to continue the economic recovery.
The bill to set up a referendum on EU membership also needs to be addressed quickly, and every effort made to ensure insofar as this is possible that both "In" and "Out" sides regard the question asked, as well as the rules for the referendum such as the arrangements for TV coverage of each side of the debate, spending limits etc as fair.
This is important for the country but doubly so for the Conservatives: it is inevitable that significant parts of the Conservative party will be on each side of the referendum debate. Whichever way it goes the successful side is going to have to work with the people who have lost. That will be much easier if the people on the losing side accept that the result was fair and genuinely reflected the will of the British people, than if they feel robbed.
To keep moving forward on the difficult measures necessary to maintain the recovery and resist the temptation to start fighting amongst ourselves when Labour fails for a while to provide an effective opposition will require steady nerves and ruthless clear-sightedness. But it must be done.
Comments
Sometimes the answer lies in looking outside the westminster bubble, and the political hacks, and just put your ear to the ground.
Sometimes that is how you can judge the mood.
Nevermind telling the electorate what you must do to win back votes, for goodness sake, listen to them.