The Glorious First of June - the battle both sides won
It is almost unique in warfare, though not quite impossible, for both sides in a conflict to succeed in the object for which they fought.
One of the very few battles in which this happened took place two hundred and twenty-six years ago today - the naval battle which is occasionally called the 4th battle of Ushant but is more often referred to as the Glorious First of June.
In spring 1794, early in the French Revolutionary wars, the economy of France had been badly disrupted by a combination of war, revolution and bad harvests, and there were severe shortages of food. The Committee of Public Safety, possibly the most ironically named government in history considering the number of people it had executed, arranged a grain convoy from America to France - but they had to get it safely from one side of the Atlantic to the other.
This is a situation most Britain people should be able to understand as we have often been on the other side of this particular challenge - getting food from the other side of the world in the face of hostile attack at sea.
That, of course, was part of the problem the French faced - an adversary who understood their situation all too well.
But the Royal Navy had no particular interest in starving the French people. Their objective was the safety of the British Isles - and the threat to these islands wasn't a grain convoy, it was the French navy.
To the British, the significance of the grain convoy was that it was an objective the enemy had to defend - which meant he could be brought to battle.
The objective for which the French fleet fought was to get the convoy through - but the objective for which the Royal Navy fleet fought to wreck the French fleet. Both sides achieved those objectives.
Naval battles in the 18th century followed a formal, rigid pattern with fleets of ships following one another straight lines (the line of battle) which could deal out a lot of punishment but were very hard to attack. AS a result most naval battles of the period were indecisive, and taking a couple of enemy ships out of thirty was a victory.
The British commander at the Glorious First of June, Admiral Earl Howe, was one of the first of a new breed of commanders who realised that if you wanted to take more than one or two ships, you had to throw that rulebook out of the window. He ordered his captains to break through the French line, surrounding and isolating the ships in the centre of their line - and he predicted that for every captain and ship who followed his orders properly, a French battleship would be captured. In the event this prediction was precisely right - with a further enemy ship sunk outright.
The French fleet put itself between the convoy and the British. The British went hell for leather at their objective - which was not the convoy, but the French fleet. The convoy retuned safely to France: a significant part of their fleet did not. Both sides claimed a strategic victory - and both were right.
Howe's tactics were an inspiration to another up and coming officer of even greater ability who was a Captain RN at the time of the Glorious First of June - he was not at the battle but learned the right lessons from it. One of them was that a fighting admiral needed to drill his captains as a "band of brothers" working together to ruthlessly harry the enemy. Another was that, just as Admirals like Howe and Rodney had thrown the rulebook out of the window to seriously damage the enemy rather than fighting a string of perfectly choreographed and indecisive battles, the world was entering an era of total war where the successful commander aimed not just to seriously damage the enemy but to utterly destroy him as a coherent force.
That young captain's name was Horatio Nelson.
One of the very few battles in which this happened took place two hundred and twenty-six years ago today - the naval battle which is occasionally called the 4th battle of Ushant but is more often referred to as the Glorious First of June.
In spring 1794, early in the French Revolutionary wars, the economy of France had been badly disrupted by a combination of war, revolution and bad harvests, and there were severe shortages of food. The Committee of Public Safety, possibly the most ironically named government in history considering the number of people it had executed, arranged a grain convoy from America to France - but they had to get it safely from one side of the Atlantic to the other.
This is a situation most Britain people should be able to understand as we have often been on the other side of this particular challenge - getting food from the other side of the world in the face of hostile attack at sea.
That, of course, was part of the problem the French faced - an adversary who understood their situation all too well.
But the Royal Navy had no particular interest in starving the French people. Their objective was the safety of the British Isles - and the threat to these islands wasn't a grain convoy, it was the French navy.
To the British, the significance of the grain convoy was that it was an objective the enemy had to defend - which meant he could be brought to battle.
The objective for which the French fleet fought was to get the convoy through - but the objective for which the Royal Navy fleet fought to wreck the French fleet. Both sides achieved those objectives.
Naval battles in the 18th century followed a formal, rigid pattern with fleets of ships following one another straight lines (the line of battle) which could deal out a lot of punishment but were very hard to attack. AS a result most naval battles of the period were indecisive, and taking a couple of enemy ships out of thirty was a victory.
The British commander at the Glorious First of June, Admiral Earl Howe, was one of the first of a new breed of commanders who realised that if you wanted to take more than one or two ships, you had to throw that rulebook out of the window. He ordered his captains to break through the French line, surrounding and isolating the ships in the centre of their line - and he predicted that for every captain and ship who followed his orders properly, a French battleship would be captured. In the event this prediction was precisely right - with a further enemy ship sunk outright.
The French fleet put itself between the convoy and the British. The British went hell for leather at their objective - which was not the convoy, but the French fleet. The convoy retuned safely to France: a significant part of their fleet did not. Both sides claimed a strategic victory - and both were right.
Howe's tactics were an inspiration to another up and coming officer of even greater ability who was a Captain RN at the time of the Glorious First of June - he was not at the battle but learned the right lessons from it. One of them was that a fighting admiral needed to drill his captains as a "band of brothers" working together to ruthlessly harry the enemy. Another was that, just as Admirals like Howe and Rodney had thrown the rulebook out of the window to seriously damage the enemy rather than fighting a string of perfectly choreographed and indecisive battles, the world was entering an era of total war where the successful commander aimed not just to seriously damage the enemy but to utterly destroy him as a coherent force.
That young captain's name was Horatio Nelson.
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